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Abstract
Innovations in information technologies have facilitated the development of new
styles of research networks and forms of governance. This is evident in genomics
where increasingly, research is carried out by large, interdisciplinary consortia focussing
on a specific research endeavour. The UK10K project is an example of a human genomics
consortium funded to provide insights into the genomics of rare conditions, and
establish a community resource from generated sequence data. To achieve its
objectives according to the agreed timetable, the UK10K project established an
internal governance system to expedite the research and to deal with the complex
issues that arose. The project’s governance structure exemplifies a new form of
network governance called ‘pop-up’ governance. ‘Pop-up’ because: it was put together
quickly, existed for a specific period, was designed for a specific purpose, and was
dismantled easily on project completion. In this paper, we use UK10K to describe how
‘pop-up’ governance works on the ground and how relational, hierarchical and
contractual governance mechanisms are used in this new form of network governance.
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Introduction
Information technologies have facilitated the development of networks, leading to new
styles and forms of governance (Kersbergen & Waarden 2004). This is evident in the
biomedical research context where research is increasingly carried out by large
consortia that bring together interdisciplinary networks of researchers and institu-
tions to focus on a specific research endeavour. Quite often, these projects are
funded for a specific purpose over a limited funding period, and so are working to
tight deadlines which require clear management, coordination and cooperation to
achieve the goals of the project. Research must progress according to the agreed
timetable, and allocated finances must be spent according to the approved grant
submission. In response to these demands, new forms of network governance have
developed to deal with the potentially contentious issues arising from the research
activities of the consortium, such as publication moratoria, management of inci-
dental findings, data access, as well as being accountable to external bodies. We
are calling this new form of network governance ‘pop-up governance’, because it is
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established for a limited duration and purpose, and is dismantled once the project
ends and it is no longer needed.
The system of committees and processes developed in the UK10K project (2010 – 2013)
1 is an example of ‘pop- up’ governance. The UK10K consortium was initiated and led by
the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute (WTSI) and was funded to establish insights into rare
genetic diseases with the sequence data generated from the project used to establish a
community resource. The purpose of this paper is to describe some of the features of this
new form of research governance, which is found in interconnected research networks.
We will use the UK10K project as an example of how ‘pop- up’ governance works in prac-
tice and show how it combined the features of networks with relational, hierarchical and
contractual governance mechanisms. In the final section of the paper we will analyze some
of the key components that are needed to make a ‘pop- up’ governance structure effective.
Network governance
There has been a considerable amount of research on the organizational practices and
arrangements that are network-like in form (Powell 1990). Networks have been defined as
“groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve
not only their own goals but also a collective goal” (Willem & Gemmel 2013; Provan &
Kenis 2008). Networks have been conceptualised as pluri-centric forms of governance, in
contrast to multi-centric (market) and uni-centric (state / firm hierarchy) (Rhodes 2000).
They are considered to be self-organizing, and to “resist government steering, develop
their own policies and mould their environments” (Rhodes 2000: 61). They are charac-
terised by an exchange of resources and negotiations and by game-like interactions
“rooted in trust and regulated by the rules of the game negotiated and agreed by network
participants” (Rhodes 2000: 61). While networks are diverse, there is sufficient generality
to identify common characteristics but also to identify the circumstances that promote
and sustain networks. The characteristics of networks identified in a number of studies
are strong relationships (Willem and Gemmel 2013); interdependent experts (Powell 1990);
collective working (Hertel et al 2000); groups with strong identities (Simon et al 2000); and
the importance of a common goal. Many of these characteristics have been identified in the
field of biomedical research by other scholars (Joly et al 2012; Dyke and Hubbard 2011;
Fortin et al 2011; Field et al 2009; Tenopir et al 2011) and were evident in the ‘pop-up’ gov-
ernance structure of the UK10K project. However, there have been no studies that have
gone beyond identification of these features to demonstrate how they work as regulatory
mechanisms in the governance structure of research projects.
There has also been considerable debate as to the type of governance mechanisms - re-
lational, contractual and hierarchical - that lead to the most effective networks, and
whether these elements are evident in all kinds of networks (Entwistle et al 2007; Herranz
2008). In their study of healthcare networks, Willem and Gemmel found there were com-
binations of hierarchical, contractual and relational governance mechanisms in use within
healthcare networks. Relational governance ‘refers to co-ordination based on trust,
reciprocity, and common norms and values that are embedded in the relationships
between the partners in networks’ (Willem & Gemmel 2013). Although relational
governance is traditionally thought to be the primary governance mechanism in
networks, the studies in health care suggest that this might not always be the case
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(Willem & Gemmel 2013). For instance, Willem and Gemmel found that some of
the contractual and pricing governance mechanisms that are typical of markets
(Ferguson et al 2005) are also evident in healthcare networks. The contractual
mechanism refers to the extent to which the collaboration is detailed and formal-
ized in contracts.
Willem and Gemmel also found that hierarchal governance mechanisms were evident
in healthcare networks, as collaborations were coordinated by one partner or a repre-
sentative who had authority over others. This was in accordance with Milward and Pro-
van’s research, (Provan & Milward 1995) that showed in networks where the
government participates to provide services, such as mental health services, a hierarch-
ical relationship might arise between the funding and controlling governmental agen-
cies, and the non -profit organizations providing the services. The governance
structure of the network can be deliberately chosen to give certain partners in the
network more or less power, e.g. granting sufficient power to the financing govern-
ment. Therefore, according to Willem and Gemmel, “Certain combinations of gov-
ernance structure, governance mechanisms and network attributes lead to a more
effective network configuration” (Willem & Gemmel 2013: 231). They found
balanced combinations made an effective health care governance network. However,
Willem and Gemmel have not as yet published a description of what these
governance mechanisms might consist of. There has also been no analysis of this
kind in regard to research networks, as their work focused on healthcare delivery
networks.
The importance of this paper is that it articulates the concept and features of ‘pop-
up’ governance that is found increasingly in biomedical research. The paper notes the
existing research conducted by Lewis et al (2014) and the ‘pop- up clinic’ and contrib-
utes a description of the characteristics of network governance that have been identified
in the literature that can be found in ‘pop-up’ governance and are exemplified by the
UK10K project. By building on the work of Willem and Gemmel and their observations
of clinical networks, we describe how the hierarchical, relational and contractual mech-
anisms are enacted in a research network, and in doing so extend the literature in this
area.
What is ‘pop- up’ governance?
The governance structures that have been developed for research consortia can be
described as a form of network governance. In genomics, the lifetime of these
structures is usually for the duration with the funding which accords with the time
needed to deliver the specific goals of the project. ‘Pop- up’ governance, while tran-
sitory, is something more than just good project management or team organization.
It can only succeed because there are other more formal governance structures
around the project that support it and enable this ‘pop- up’ governance structure
to be established and to function. Although they are of fixed duration, these gov-
ernance structures are designed for optimum productivity as well as being struc-
tures that are reflexive and responsive to the many issues that arise as the research
is initiated, coordinated and executed (Laurie 2011).
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As a structure, ‘pop-up’ governance depends upon a complex blend of trust and re-
spect for professional integrity and the ability of the project members to carry out their
allocated project tasks, combined with more formal hierarchical mechanisms such as
committees, procedures and guidelines, to deal with the potentially contentious issues
arising from the research. Ways to manage access to samples and data are built into
the project design to meet legal requirements and to ensure that the samples and data
flow to the right people at the right time. External regulatory requirements must be
met, such as the Human Tissue Act or, when dealing with personal data, adherence to
the requirements of the Information Commissioner’s Office. Contractual mechanisms
such as project agreements between the consortium collaborators and between the
consortium and the funders are also essential for ‘pop- up’ governance.
It is this combination of formalized project committees and professional relationships
that bring in relational, hierarchical and contractual elements that distinguishes ‘pop-
up’ governance from good project or team management. While many of the issues
around virtual team management that are discussed in the literature (Hertel et al 2000)
have a resonance with the governance structures of genomics consortium, this does not
explain all of the dimensions of ‘pop- up’ governance, which also has a formal govern-
ance dimension. This feature of these consortia consists of a hierarchical management
and administrative structure with delegated authority to committees, individuals or spe-
cialists, such as the Project Manager, or regulatory and policy advisers. These commit-
tees consist of individuals with specific expertise and knowledge that can deal with the
issues that are central to achieving the objectives of the research project, such as publi-
cation moratoria, incidental findings and data access. Underpinning these committees
are more relational mechanisms that are features of networks. The fact that these issues
are also of importance to the external regulatory bodies, such as research ethics com-
mittees, funders and the host institution, provides another reason for ensuring that they
are dealt with through a formal governance structure in a credible, transparent and ac-
countable way.
Crucially, ‘pop- up’ governance can only exist because there is an external regulatory
framework in place that supports it and from which ‘pop up’ governance emerges for
the period that it is needed. This external regulatory framework can be described as a
system of polycentric governance. Such regulatory regimes are those in which the state
is not the sole locus of authority, or indeed in which it may play no role at all. They are
marked by fragmentation, complexity and interdependence between actors, in which
state and non-state actors are both regulators and regulated, and their boundaries are
marked by the issues or problems which they are concerned with, rather than necessar-
ily by a common solution (Black 2001). Within biomedical research there are a number
of organizations within the UK that have a role in regulating this system of polycentric
governance (Kaye et al 2012). In relation to genomics consortia, the key bodies are the
research ethics committees (RECs) whose approval must be obtained before new re-
search commences under NRES guidelines; the funders whose data sharing policies re-
quire that data must be shared widely; the online data repository where the sequence
data is stored (in UK10K, the European Genome-phenome archive (EGA)) and the in-
stitutions that provide a safe working environment and are ultimately responsible for
the conduct of their employees. However, all of these bodies give considerable latitude
to researchers as to how research projects are run and carried out (Kaye & Hawkins
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2014). This is particularly the case in research consortia in genomics where new policy,
procedures, and practices in the form of ‘pop- up’ governance have been developed.
These external bodies will provide valuable expertise when needed and therefore there
is a flow of information between the ‘pop- up’ governance structure and the external
governance bodies. However the basis of interactions relies on a complex blend of rela-
tional mechanisms with people working together, supported by contractual mechanisms
such as project agreements, and researcher ethics committee approvals (Figure 1).
Box 1 Features of ‘Pop- Up’ Governance
The UK10K project
‘Pop- up’ governance has worked particularly well for the UK10K project2 and enabled
the project to reach its objectives, despite this being a complex task, with a large num-
ber of contributing partners, all with different expertise and interests. The specific aims
of the project were to improve understanding of the role of low frequency and rare
genetic variants in health and disease, and to provide a data resource that could be
used on a long term basis by the research community. The governance structure
1. Has a limited life span
2. Is focussed on a specific purpose
3. Professional relations underpin the governance structure
4. Clear and decisive leadership and management
5. Expertise that can be utilised for specific tasks and committee functions
6. Clear committee hierarchy
7. Effective administration
8. Situated within an existing external governance system
9. Use of contractual mechanisms to underpin network activities
Fig. 1 Features of ‘Pop – Up Governance
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developed for UK10K had to be robust and able to adapt as required to meet these
aims, as the tasks changed over time. At the time of writing, UK10K was Britain’s lar-
gest genomic sequencing consortium, having been awarded a £10.5 million Strategic
Award by the Wellcome Trust.3
The main purpose of UK10K was to sequence the DNA of close to 10,000 people. To
obtain this number of samples required input from a number of other studies where
samples had already been collected or where there was easy access to patients to obtain
new samples. Two well established cohort studies in the UK; TwinsUK and the Avon Lon-
gitudinal Study of Parents and Children (ALSPAC) provided four thousand of these sam-
ples, which were sequenced to approximately six fold coverage of their entire genome,
generating a detailed sequence reference database connected to phenotypic and clinical
data. Approximately six thousand samples were provided from existing collections span-
ning eleven different rare conditions or diseases to make up the total, and these were
whole exome sequenced.
Patients included in the ‘disease’ arm of the project had already been diagnosed with
a medical condition that was the subject of research, and all had been previously been
recruited into other research studies prior to the commencement of UK10K. UK10K
compared the sequences of individuals with a disease phenotype with those people
from the cohorts group who had not been clinically diagnosed with the conditions be-
ing studied in UK10K, to try to identify rare and low frequency genetic variants associ-
ated with health and disease. It also provided an opportunity for researchers to be
involved in a large, existing collaborative project that had been awarded funding which
allowed sequencing to be carried out. It also provided an additional benefit of providing
information that would become a unique research database for the research community
as a whole. The data generated during the project was then made available to re-
searchers outside UK10K via the EGA at the European Bioinformatics Institute (EMBL
EBI), Hinxton, Cambridge, UK, which has the infrastructure to facilitate managed data
access to data files.
As a collective endeavor, the UK10K project consisted of a number of stages and ac-
tivities that had to be closely monitored, overseen and/or reviewed during their imple-
mentation, as would be expected for a sequencing project demonstrating best practice.
A significant logistical challenge for the project was coordinating the activities of in ex-
cess of forty collaborators, from different disciplinary backgrounds, and working in dif-
ferent institutions across the country. To ensure that the project did not overrun or fail
to achieve its sequencing target, it was crucial that strict deadlines for submitting sam-
ples to the project were adhered to by participating collaborators so that delays to the
sequencing pipeline at the Wellcome Trust Sanger Institute (WTSI) were minimized.
To facilitate the smooth and efficient entry of DNA samples into the sequencing
pipeline a number of regulatory and ethical requirements had to be met first, which
also ensured the project was carried out to high standards of best practice. This began
with a rigorous check that the existing consents and/or research ethics approval at-
tached to the samples also permitted sequencing in a project such as UK10K, and the
deposition of data in the EGA. Additionally, the fact that some of the disease pheno-
types included in the project were rare or uncommon potentially increases the risk that
some patients might have been re-identified and required extra safeguards in data
handling. To minimise this risk, consideration of the type of data deposited, careful
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monitoring of data release and subsequent uptake by the community was essential, and
had to be included in any governance framework for the project.
The UK10K governance structure
From the earliest pre-planning stages of the UK10K project there was a clear need for
defined, internal governance mechanisms that would enable project activities to be co-
ordinated and carried out efficiently and effectively. In particular: meeting the timetable
for sequencing through the Sanger Institute pipeline. Committees were established to
oversee potentially contentious issues for the consortium and provided a mechanism
for resolving these issues in a fair and transparent way. In doing so, this governance
structure also provided a credible system of accountability for external funders and in-
stitutions. The set of committees that were established were hierarchical in nature, as
some individual members of the consortium were delegated to make decisions that
would affect the activities of other members. However, these committees only had cred-
ibility and legitimacy because they relied on the relational aspects of the consortium -
the trust, reciprocity and common norms and values that were found in the relation-
ships between collaborators in the UK10K project.
The formation of the Management Committee (MC), Ethical Advisory Group (EAG),
the Data Access Committee (DAC), and the Publications Committee (PC) are examples
of hierarchical mechanisms being used in a distributed network. The members of each
committee were selected on the basis of their expertise and ability to commit sufficient
time and resources as required for the successful running of the project. Some individ-
uals, such as the Project Manager served on more than one committee, which was use-
ful in those instances where committees had to work closely together to complete
specific tasks and meet research deliverables. Each of these governance committees had
delegated decision making responsibilities for designated activities within the consor-
tium, and some went on to develop project policy to further guide decision making.
a) Management committee
The UK10K project had a clearly defined management hierarchy of committees and in-
dividuals, with the Management Committee (MC) being the single body empowered
with sufficient authority (and ultimate responsibility) for directing the project to
achieve its goals. It consisted of leaders from each of the research teams and all the co-
applicants to the grant application, which had the effect of enabling transparent deci-
sion making but also keeping the project focussed on its deliverables.
The MC was identified at the grant application stage, and remained in place through-
out the lifetime of the consortium. The MC took ultimate responsibility for the plan-
ning and execution of the project, and all other committees were required to report
back to the MC on a regular basis, via appropriate channels. The committee approved
all decisions relating to the fundamental delivery and quality of the research, and was
the final arbitrator on any contentious issues arising during the project’s lifetime. Func-
tioning as a single voice within a consortium of more than one hundred individuals,
this body was accountable to the funders and the WTSI, for UK10K’s activities. How-
ever, the clinicians collecting samples were responsible to the regulators, such as the
Human Tissue Authority for the collection of samples and relevant professional bodies
such as the General Medical Council (GMC).
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As the central governing executive for UK10K, the MC was led by the Principal In-
vestigator (PI) and assisted by the Project Manager (PM). The PM oversaw and where
necessary executed the MC’s decisions by working closely with the other committees
and consortium members. The rest of the MC comprised of at least two representatives
from each of the research groups working with DNA collections: cohorts, neurodeve-
lopmental disorders, rare diseases and obesity; as well as representatives from the
groups leading statistical analyses, ethics and production (sequencing and data delivery)
in the project. The MC drew on the expertise and knowledge of the specialist commit-
tees answerable to it within the project and regulatory and policy advisers working
within WTSI when making decisions. Also on the MC were the Production Chairs,
who held a particularly pivotal role in the project, as they were ultimately responsible
for overseeing the sequencing pipeline and delivering project data of a quality that was
useful to other members of the consortium. Initially, MC meetings took place every
two weeks in order to ensure a rapid response to any emerging issues and to set up ap-
propriate mechanisms to move the project forward. Midway through the project when
data generation was well underway and relatively problem free, such frequent meetings
were unnecessary and the MC only convened once a month until the final stages of
project, when the MC resumed its fortnightly meetings to ensure that all deliverables
would be achieved on time and to budget.
b) Ethical advisory group
Whilst the consortium quickly identified certain production and process related issues
that were likely to arise during the operation of the project, other issues were felt to be
more difficult to address. To tackle these, the Ethical Advisory Group (EAG) was cre-
ated to provide guidance on any ethical and legal issues emerging in UK10K. The EAG
consisted of two co-chairs, eight UK10K researchers, a regulatory and a policy advisor
and three external members, one of which represented a consortium of patient groups.
One of the key documents produced by the EAG was the Ethical Governance Frame-
work (EGF).4 This document sought to address some of the key ethical and legal issues
that were likely to arise both before and during the project. These included:
1. Regulatory requirements and REC approvals;
2. Informed consent and the process of withdrawal from the project;
3. A management pathway for feeding back results to participants; and
4. Data access.
A scoping exercise was initially carried out to capture the wide ranging differences in
donor consents and REC approvals which had been previously obtained by sample cus-
todians holding pre collected samples from other studies, particularly referring to se-
quencing, the feeding back or otherwise of findings and data sharing. These had
previously been obtained by sample custodians holding pre-collected samples for other
studies. As these samples would be subsequently used in UK10K,the EAG were inter-
ested in recommendations concerning consent and REC approvals that needed to be
included in the EGF. The EAG ensured that the requirements of the external regula-
tors, the research ethics committees, were met and anticipated by all members of the
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consortium. If this had not been coordinated through a formal structure it would have
been harder to meet the regulatory requirements within the timetable of the project.
When drafting the EGF document, members of the EAG drew on existing govern-
ance frameworks found in other projects, such as the UK Biobank and the International
Cancer Genome Consortium. The EGF outlined ethical principles to which all re-
searchers within UK10K must adhere, but afforded some flexibility to how those princi-
ples could practically be achieved. It ensured that samples used in the project had
appropriate donor consent and/or REC approval attached to them, and this included
approval for sequencing, deposition of data in an electronic archive and subsequent
data sharing. The EGF was reviewed by all principle investigators within UK10K, then
later by four external reviewers and posted on the project website. The EAG focused
on particular issues that arose in the project, which were specific to meeting the project
objectives, and had sufficient expertise to deal with them in a way that would meet the
standards and concerns of external regulators. In doing so, this group focussed on ad-
dressing the contentious issues for the consortium, such as incidental findings, where
there was no well- established procedure to draw upon. The management pathway for
the return of pre-defined clinical results or incidental findings (Kaye and Hawkins
2014), to some participants, was developed because the extensive sequencing under-
taken in UK10K meant it was highly likely that researchers would discover variations
that could have health or reproductive significance for the participant. It was decided
that these would only be returned if they were linked to the disorder which was the
focus of the original study into which participants had been recruited.
c) Publications committee
The Publications Committee (PC) was established to help protect the first publication
rights of UK10K’s sample custodians and data generators by overseeing a publication
moratorium, and to ensure that project data used in publications (written by consor-
tium collaborators) was correctly and appropriately acknowledged. Publications are
very important to academic research communities - they are one of the metrics used to
assess career progression - and also establish and maintain a scientific team’s reputa-
tion. Therefore, authorship can be a very contentious issue within a consortium, and
who has access to data is important as this could determine the basis for authorship for
papers based on UK10K data. The issue of publication moratoria arose during develop-
ment of the project’s data access agreement at the start of the project, to balance the
benefits of rapid data deposition in the public domain, with first publication rights of
the data producers - as it was felt that it would be unfair for people to produce se-
quence data and then potentially be undercut on publishing a finding because they did
not have the time to produce and analyse the data at the same time. It was agreed by
the MC that a publication moratorium lasting one year struck an appropriate balance
between making data available as soon as possible to researchers outside of the consor-
tium, whilst giving UK10K researchers a reasonable timeframe in which to publish their
own research findings. This moratorium period was also in line with the policies of pre-
viously funded Wellcome Trust projects such as the Wellcome Trust Case Control
Consortium (WTCCC).
Members of the PC were nominated at the start of the project and endorsed by
the MC. The committee comprised of the PM and a number of individuals who
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were also MC chairs, some based at the WTSI, and some based off site. This was an
important balance; although WTSI was the leading institution in the project, the
committee responsible for deciding the publication of research findings was not
dominated by the same institution. As previously mentioned, an advantage of commit-
tee overlap was that it encouraged a regular dialogue between the PC and the MC. Any
publications or documentation produced within the consortium using UK10K ma-
terials and citing the project had to be approved by the PC prior to submission,
and this included all posters, abstracts and publications. The PC did not convene
in person, but instead received documents by email (circulated by the PM). The
PC required a minimum period of 1 to 2 weeks’ notice to review documents.
d) Data access committee
Not all of the committees were established internally in the project- the consortium used an
existing external Data Access Committee to oversee applications from outside the project
for access to the project generated information. This is an example of the consortium draw-
ing upon an existing regulatory structure to help it resolve a potentially contentious issue
and potential conflicts of interest. Due to the detailed and potentially identifiable nature of
the sequence information generated in UK10K, it was decided from the outset that the data
would only be made available to third party researchers under the terms of a managed ac-
cess policy. This was to comply with the Wellcome Trust principles of sharing data,5 whilst
still protecting the interests of both UK10K researchers and privacy of participants. Rather
than set up its own DAC, the UK10K project drew on the pre-existing DAC already operat-
ing out of the Wellcome Trust (WT), London, to formally approve access to UK10K data-
sets held in the EGA. The WT DAC was already well established and highly competent at
interpreting applications to use data. Crucially the DAC was independent from UK10K with
no conflict of interest in the approval or rejection of applications.
The PM and the UK10K Production Team worked closely with the EGA to facilitate
a rolling release of data to the EGA and, therefore, on to approved third party Data
Users as and when the data was ready. In this way the community benefited from rapid
access to UK10K data, rather than having to wait until the end of the project. To apply
for access, researchers outside of UK10K had to download and complete a Data Access
Agreement (DAA), designed specifically for the project.6 This would then be submitted
to the PM as publicly designated point of contact within the project. After logging the
application on the project wiki (allowing the PM to monitor the status of all DAAs
through to the point of DAC approval), the PM would then triage applications (ensur-
ing full and correct completion), before sending onto the DAC for final, formal ap-
proval. The DAC then notified the EGA and researchers were given access to the
sequence data under the EGA’s managed access system. This is an example of where
the consortium utilised the expertise of external bodies to help meet the objectives of
the project, and enabled a system of accountability and oversight to be implemented
that drew upon expertise that did not exist in the consortium.
What are the key features of this governance framework?
The ‘pop- up’ governance system implemented in UK10K had a number of key features
that enabled it to function as well as it did, nestled within an external regulatory and
ethical framework. Routine and contentious issues alike could be resolved in a fair and
Kaye et al. Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2015) 11:10 Page 10 of 17
transparent way between the involved parties, and the system was structured in such a
way that decision making was documented (and/or minuted) and could be held ac-
countable to the project’s funders. This structure was able to unite people from differ-
ent disciplines and localities under a common banner of the project, while still allowing
them the flexibility to use their professional expertise and judgment to carry out the
tasks allocated to them. In this way, the project drew on a combination of relational,
hierarchical and contractual governance mechanisms to enable the deliverables to be
met. The key features of pop- up governance are: a common purpose, interdependency,
a formal committee structure and an existing external governance environment.
a) Common purpose
A number of studies have investigated the theory of collective action and motivational
gains, to investigate network relations. Collective action relates to specific behaviours
designed to promote the welfare of one’s group (Tropp & Brown 2004). Group mem-
bers act as representatives of their group in order to improve the situation of their en-
tire group. Thus, collective action is understood as being guided by one’s self-
representation as a group member and intended to bring about a change for one’s
group as a whole (Kelly & Breinlinger 1996; Simon & Klandermans 2001). Simon et al.
(2000) propose that when group identities become salient, there will be a shift in focus
from the individual to the group, such that collective action will be motivated primarily
by concern for and obligation to one’s group, and less by egoistic concerns of the indi-
vidual. There is evidence that greater identification is associated with greater support
for collective action: an inner sense of obligation to one’s group may underlie relation-
ships between group identification and a willingness to engage in collective action for
one’s group (Simon et al 2000).
Collective action and common purpose were key features of the consortium. This was
strengthened by the fact that members had a common background; the more homoge-
neous the groups, the greater the trust and hence the easier it is to sustain network like
arrangements (Simon et al 2000). This kind of relational governance (as opposed to con-
tractual or hierarchical governance) enabled coordination based on trust, reciprocity, and
common norms and values that were embedded in the relationships between the partners
in networks (Willem & Gemmel 2013). Even though people had their own interests, the
general ethos was that the project came first. At times this had to be reinforced through
the committees but, in general, there was a shared assumption that the project aims came
above individual concerns and research agendas. A strong driving force was that it was
only by working together that everyone could achieve the benefits, as to sequence 10,000
genomes was beyond a single researcher’s capability. The clinicians supplied the samples
from the patients they were treating and in return they had access to state of the art se-
quencing data for their patients which could assist with eventual treatment and diagnosis.
They also had the benefit of being involved in a leading consortium. The WTSI brought
state of the art sequencing technology and knowledge of running large projects, but they
also had a research interest in analysing the sequence information. This common purpose
overcame the geographical distribution of the consortium. Although the consortium
members were dispersed in different institutions across the country, the geographical dis-
tance between project members did not impede the project. This was because there were
strong motivational rewards for participation in the project, being part of a large,
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collaborative project that was establishing a sequencing resource for the country. This
alignment was a strong incentive for collaboration, and could be seen as a relational gov-
ernance mechanism that provided the basis for developing trust by establishing or intensi-
fying the collaboration between the researchers in the project.
b) Interdependency
Studies involving team sports have proven that interdependency between individuals is
a motivator for collective action; meaning that individuals work harder as a team than
as individuals so as not to let other team members down (Messé et al. 2002). Further-
more, repeated interaction amongst individuals has powerful consequences; “when
there is a high probability of future association, persons are not only more likely to co-
operate with others; they are also increasingly willing to punish those who do not co-
operate” (Axelrod 1984).
The UK10K project had very clear goals, and each member of the consortium was a
member because of the role that they would play in achieving these goals. The sequen-
cing pipeline meant that all of the member’s activities were dependent on each other
and they had to coordinate their independent activities frequently. This alignment
meant that the possibility of someone losing motivation or not knowing how their ac-
tions related to others was not possible. Another factor was the potential for reputa-
tional harm. This has been found to be a strong motivator in other network settings,
where there is little separation of formal business statuses and personal social roles
(Powell 1990). Thus, the relational aspects of a network can lead to strong compliance
with project decision-making and prioritisation of the project objectives by collabora-
tors. These relational elements were key to the aims of UK10K.
In the UK10K project, compliance was ensured by the project’s shared vision and to
some extent, peer pressure. Individual members did not want to be perceived as the
person that was slowing down progress. If an individual was not pulling their weight
this was made obvious by the sequencing pipeline, which had to be carefully co-
ordinated within the allocated sequencing time. Weekly MC meetings were an oppor-
tunity for performance review and accountability. They were also an opportunity to
congratulate good work in the project. These meetings were transparent and the MC
could flag up any issues and what needed to be done to address these. This internal
monitoring encouraged the various parties to do their tasks and where necessary, to do
them to a higher standard. For individual researchers their professional reputation was
at stake if they let people down, which encouraged people to meet deadlines and make
the project a priority in amongst their other work and research commitments.
This is in accordance with other studies where it was found that ‘persons mobilize
additional efforts when they believe that own poor performance would inhibit other
team members in their work’ (Hertel et al 2000; Messe et al 2002).
c) Committee decision making
The formal, hierarchical structure of committees in the UK10K project achieved two
distinct goals. First, they enabled the project deliverables to be met, and second they
enabled the contentious issues in the project around publications, ethical and legal is-
sues and data access, to be addressed in a transparent way by peers. However, these
hierarchical governance mechanisms were only successful because they depended upon
Kaye et al. Life Sciences, Society and Policy  (2015) 11:10 Page 12 of 17
relational aspects of the network, demonstrated by each of the committees within the
UK10K project.
One of the key features of the UK10K governance framework was that by working to-
gether, the committees developed a web of governance that created a system of ‘checks
and balances’ to ensure that project deliverables could be met. This meant that import-
ant issues of concern to members of the project and external funders and institutions,
which had potential implications for research integrity and professional standing, were
dealt with quickly and transparently.
This delegation also took the responsibility for decision making away from the hard
pressed MC and placed it in the hands of people with expertise and knowledge. Powell
has highlighted how “know-how; the demand for speed, and trust” are critical compo-
nents of networks (Powell 1990). Therefore, the highly skilled, intellectual workforce of
the UK10K consortium was particularly well suited to a network form of organization,
but also provided the basis for effective committees.
The responsibilities of each of the committees were clearly defined from the outset,
and shared across those who were willing and had the relevant expertise. This meant
that there was sufficient expertise, delegation and interrelationships between the gov-
ernance structures, to make decisions independent of the MC. For example, the work
of the DAC was made easier because the PM conducted a preliminary review of all
DAAs before forwarding them on. This review stage was easy for the PM to undertake
because of her working knowledge of all the UK10K studies included in the project,
and any restrictions on data use. In turn, the MC welcomed the role of the DAC in
granting final approval for DAAs, as this allowed the MC to remain impartial in the
matter of data access, and ensured that the process was not hindered or delayed.
This principle also applied to the approval of UK10K publications; having a dedicated
publication committee ensured that proposed publications were quickly approved and
submitted to journals, whilst still protecting the interests of the consortium. Having a
fixed group acting as the PC ensured the continuity of policy regarding authorship. It
also fostered trust as authors were reassured that their efforts would not be exploited
by other team members (Harlow & Rawlings 2007). Overall, these structured commit-
tees enabled the project deliverables to be achieved within a very tight time frame,
which was important in a project where resources were limited and required an effi-
cient use of people’s time and expertise.
This interrelationship was possible because there were people that linked the various
committee activities of the project together (Guzzo & Dickson 1996; Hertel et al 2003).
For example, the Project Manager was an important member of the MC and the PC,
and also played a key role in UK10K data management. As a designated point of con-
tact for the project both within and outside of the consortium (and also to the public),
the PM helped to coordinate activities between committees and across UK10K. This
was also true of some of the key people who served on the various committees, were
members of their disease sub-group, and lead a task. This enabled decision making to
be fast and responsive, but also committees were aware of the decisions made in other
fora of the project. People in these positions were aware of the different responsibilities
that they had, and that as a representative of the project their decision making had to
be appropriate to the committee they were serving on. Having committees gave a cer-
tain level of accountability and transparency. While this feature is not explicitly found
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in the literature, there is recognition that networks are based on complex communica-
tion channels and a key advantage is their ability to disseminate and interpret new in-
formation, resulting in new interpretations and ultimately new linkages (Guzzo &
Dickson 1996; Hertel et al 2003).
d) External formal structures
The creation of the ‘pop-up’ governance structure was facilitated because it was sup-
ported by external formal structures and contractual mechanisms. The institutions in
which researchers were based in provided the necessary working environment to meet
many of the legal requirements and to support the research. It was these institutions
that contracted with the funder, the Wellcome Trust by providing sponsorship for the
project through the funding agreement, which established the legal obligations and re-
sponsibilities of all members of the consortium. It would not have been possible for the
relationships to be supported and the project to exist without these institutional agree-
ments. This structure of formal contractual governance mechanisms allowed the rela-
tional mechanisms of the research network to flourish. They also provided the support
for the pop-up governance structure to be established and maintained.
As well as being supported by the external regulatory and ethical framework, the
'pop-up' governance structure also enabled the requirements of external regulators, eth-
ical advisory bodies and WTSI internal policy to be met by providing a framework for
enacting these requirements. Within the UK there are a number of regulatory bodies
such as the Human Tissue Authority, the Information Commissioners Office and ethics
advisory bodies, such as research ethics committees, that place requirements and/or
ethical obligations on researchers. The ‘pop-up’ governance structure provided a mech-
anism to meet these requirements in a systematically and orderly manner for the con-
sortium as a whole, rather than for individual researchers. Therefore, 'pop-up'
governance could deal with potentially challenging issues through its committee struc-
ture, which were the same issues that were of concern to the institutions in the external
regulatory environment. In this way the ‘pop-up’ governance structure enabled the con-
sortium to operate as an effective whole to meet its own objectives while at the same
time being able to demonstrate accountability to external regulatory bodies, institutions
and funders, and uphold best ethical practice (Brownsword and Goodwin 2012).
Conclusion
For projects such as UK10K, there are limited resources both in terms of expertise and
time to establish governance systems, yet there are good reasons why such projects
should have a responsible and accountable governance structure in place. The ‘pop- up’
governance structure that was developed for UK10K provided a system of accountabil-
ity and transparency in decision making that achieved a number of goals. Firstly, it had
the effect of promoting trust between the members of the consortium, but also pro-
vided a structure that inspired confidence from external institutions, funders, regulators
and ethical advisers. It also provided an effective governance structure for meeting the
project deliverables, complying with the legal requirements of regulators in the external
regulatory environment and working to best ethical practice. To achieve this, a combin-
ation of hierarchical, relational and contractual mechanisms were used that draw upon
the relational features of networks to be effective.
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One of the features of this project is that all of the people involved had a shared vision
of what had to be achieved and a commitment to achieving the goals of the project. The
project was a success because the central aims of the project also corresponded with
researcher’s individual research interests and goals. By working together, researchers
achieved more than they would have by themselves or with a smaller partnership. The
‘pop-up’ governance structure united people from different disciplines and localities under
a common banner of the project, while still allowing them the flexibility to use their
professional expertise and judgment to carry out the tasks allocated to them. It had formal
structures of decision making, such as committees with individuals with expertise who
were well regarded for their professional knowledge or integrity, and were delegated by
the consortium to sit on the committees. Underpinning the governance structure was a
series of professional relationships based on trust, but also on the traditional scientific
drivers of not wanting to be regarded as a weak member of the consortium. Therefore,
'pop-up' governance was heavily dependent not only upon good relationships between
researchers, but also on strong leadership.
The benefit of the ‘pop- up’ governance system is that it fitted in within existing
governance structures. This structure made it clear who was responsible for what,
and the procedures were written down in policies which had the effect of promoting
certainty and efficiency. This clarity in roles meant that everybody understood what
their role was in the project and the streamlined structure also lead to benefits as it
enabled scientists to do science, whilst still being involved in the governance struc-
tures. It also meant that everyone had to go through the same procedures and there-
fore decision making was more transparent, helping to eliminate favouritism. Such a
system enabled problems to be anticipated as there were mechanisms in place to
deal with routine issues but, also, unanticipated situations could be resolved effi-
ciently. Having a governance system in place ensured that ethical and lawful re-
search was supported through accountable and transparent decision making. This
not only protected the integrity of the UK10K researchers and their institutions, but
also had the effect of promoting trust between different members of the
consortium.
In summary, fundamental to the successful acquisition, use and dissemination of
UK10K sequence data and the undertaking of good and ethical science, was the support
of a robust and flexible system of internal self-regulation, developed specifically for the
project. The project governance system did not burden the project with unnecessary or
inappropriate administrative checks and balances that could potentially tie up expertise
and resources. The formal governance components of the UK10K project focused only
on the important issues, such as best ethical practice, publications, data access, feed-
back of findings and accountability to funders and the sponsoring institution. All other
issues were dealt with through the Management Committee, relying on the relational
mechanisms of trust, co-operation and co-operation. The advantage of this internal
governance framework was that it could address issues such as incidental findings,
where best practice had not been established and there was no clear legal direction.
The UK10K governance framework was designed to provide assurance and
accountability to the researchers involved in the project, the funders of the project, the
employing institutions, external regulators, ethical advisers and ultimately where neces-
sary, the research participants themselves.
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Endnotes
1UK10K Website, http://www.uk10k.org/. Accessed 5/7/2013
2UK10K Website, http://www.uk10k.org/. Accessed 5/7/2013
3See http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/News/Media-office/Press-releases/2010/WTX060061.htm
4UK10K Ethical Governance Framework: http://www.uk10k.org/assets/ef_uk10k_v21.pdf
Accessed 16 July 2013
5Welcome Trust Statement on genome data release, http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/About-us/
Policy/Policy-and-position-statements/WTD002751.htm
6UK10K Data Access Application: http://www.uk10k.org/data_access.html. Accessed 16
July 2013
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